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FOREWORD
APPELLATE ADVOCACY AND PRACTICE IN THE SECOND
CIRCUIT*
Hon. Fred I. Parkerf
INTRODUCTION
While I am aware that the actual mechanics of appellate prac-
tice and advocacy, or at least some variation thereof, has been ad-
dressed by. numerous other authors of much greater stature than
myself,' I nonetheless believe that a judge's eye view of practice
before his or her court is always useful, despite whatever repetition
may inevitably occur.
With these thoughts in mind, I turn to the substance of this
Article, namely discussing appellate practice in the Second Circuit
and providing the practitioner with a brief refresher course in appel-
late advocacy or with one judge's point of view on what constitutes
01998 Honorable Fred I. Parker. All Rights Reserved.
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1 See, e.g., John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895 (1940);
John M. Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal?,
41 CORNELL L.Q. 6 (1955); William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy, 27 S. TEx. L. REv.
289 (1986). A more lighthearted, but nonetheless enlightening, view of appellate practice
can be found in Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 BYU L. REv. 325.
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effective advocacy. By writing this Article I do not mean to imply
that I believe the advocates who appear before the Second Circuit
are in any way deficient or otherwise need improvement; quite the
contrary, my colleagues and I are blessed with some of the finest
advocacy in the country. The purpose of this Article is rather to
reemphasize the basic issues, to make some minor technical sugges-
tions that a practitioner may have overlooked while developing a
successful practice, and to perhaps offer a few novel thoughts,
hopefully in the end making good advocates better.
I have largely structured this Article to mimic the stages of an
appellate case, focusing first on the decision to appeal and then on
the briefing and the oral argument. Last, I provide some insight on
the mechanics of the court's decision-making.
I. THE DECISION TO APPEAL
The decision whether to appeal a particular case is perhaps the
most important decision made during the course of an appeal, po-
tential or realized, and while this decision is ultimately the decision
of the client, this may well be the stage of the appellate process
where advocates most often err. Advising a client to appeal as a
matter of course is simply not the best way for an advocate to prop-
erly serve the client's interests, nor does it serve the interests of the
justice system as a whole of which advocates, as officers of the
court, are an integral part.2 In advising the client on whether to
appeal, the advocate should carefully consider all the client's legiti-
mate interests and make a fundamental, though complex, determi-
nation of whether the value of the appeal to the client outweighs
the costs of prosecuting the appeal.
In my view, if the advocate properly considers the client's
legitimate interests and properly makes the value determination
when advising the client, this process will insure, by its very nature
as well as that of the justice system, that the interests of the justice
2 See Hon. Irving R. Kaufman, Appellate Advocacy in the Federal Courts, 79 F.R.D.
165, 166 (1978) (noting that "lawyers must bear significant responsibility for keeping
unworthy cases out of the appellate courts' and that such cases "serve as a roadblock
to reaching and dealing in depth with cases of substance and are in no small measure
responsible for appellate backlogs.); see also WHrrMAN KNAPP, WHY ARGUE AN APPEAL?
IF so, How? at 4 (Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York 1959).
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system as a whole will also be served. This process is primarily
driven by the careful exercise of the advocate's judgement, which is
largely what the client is paying for.
In exercising this judgment, the advocate must take into ac-
count a myriad of factors. These factors can roughly be broken
down into two sub-groups: subjective ones that specifically relate to
the client and objective ones that relate to the appeal itself. The
value of the appeal, and hence the determination of whether a
client should be advised to pursue the appeal, may be driven by
either one of these sets of considerations. The advocate should
focus first on providing the client with a complete analysis of the
objective aspects of the value of the appeal. This analysis is at bot-
tom a legal judgment; the advocate should provide the client with
his or her judgment as to the merits of the appeal, including the
likelihood of success on appeal, the value of any remedy the client
may receive if successful and the costs of prosecuting the appeal.
The objective considerations alone may lead an advocate to
advise the client that an appeal should be taken, i.e., if there is a
large chance of success on the merits, together with a large poten-
tial recovery. However, if these considerations counsel against the
filing of an appeal, the issue is not necessarily settled, and the advo-
cate should turn to the analysis of the client-specific factors. These
factors include the client's psychological condition and may in
certain circumstances-most often in criminal cases-counsel to-
ward advising a client to appeal, even where the objective
considerations counsel against taking an appeal.
The purpose underlying the complex subjective considerations
is to determine whether the objective determination of the value of
the appeal fails to properly recognize the true value of the appeal to
the client, not in strictly financial terms but rather in terms of the
classical concept of utility. Regardless of the likelihood of success
on the merits of an appeal, the client may have strong psychological
interests in pursing the appeal, which may include a simple desire
to be heard, as well as a need for closure and vindication, all of
which counsel toward advising the client to file an appeal. Even in
these circumstances, however, the client should be fully advised as
to the objective factors.
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II. THE BRIEF
Once the decision to appeal has been made, briefing is by far
the most important stage in the ensuing proceedings. From a judge's
point of view, the brief is always the starting point, and often the
ending point, of the appeal. The importance of the brief, which
cannot be overestimated, is further highlighted by the fact that the
Second Circuit necessarily affords each litigant with very short argu-
ment time-this issue will be discussed infra. Because of this fact,
advocates should spend the maximum possible time and effort in
making the brief the best possible presentation of his or her client's
case. The brief is the only time for an advocate to fully present the
argument that he or she wishes to make, and to do so largely with-
out outside interference.
The obvious starting point in the drafting of the brief is decid-
ing which issues to raise. This decision may be either very easy or
very difficult depending on the proceedings below. It has often
been said that there has never been an error-free trial, and I tend to
agree with this sentiment. However, although it may seem obvious,
when deciding which issues to appeal, the advocate should focus
not simply on errors by the district court but rather on substantial
errors by the district court which might justify an appellate court in
providing some relief to the client.
The huge variety of possible considerations affecting the
determination of what issues to raise prevents me from providing
any truly specific advice. I will, however, make one simple point.
You may believe that the district court committed twenty errors, all
of which entitle your client to some relief, and you may well be
right (though this is probably not likely with the district judges in
this Circuit). However, if in trying to convince me that the district
court committed these twenty errors by giving them all equal-and,
therefore, short-shrift, you fail to convince me that the district
court committed one error which justifies some relief for your cli-
ent, then you have done your client a tremendous disservice. While
there may be situations in which asserting a large number of claims
on appeal may be the proper thing to do, in the vast majority of
cases, no more than three or four issues should be raised. In my
view, this is probably the maximum number of claims which an
advocate can clearly and completely argue in the limited space of
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the brief,3 as well as the approximate maximum number of claims I
can give full consideration to in one case before I begin to lose
both my mind and track of the other claims.
With regard to the actual drafting of the brief, I want to stress
that in doing so, you should always remember your audience,
namely, myself and my colleagues on the bench. This audience
principle leads to a number of more specific considerations. The
fact is that appellate judges largely read briefs for a living, and
while we do not profess to know everything, we have a good work-
ing knowledge of many different aspects of the law and have been
around long enough to quickly spot distortion and obfuscation.
Therefore, keep the following points in mind:
First, clearly and honestly state the issue on appeal. A clear
statement allows for easy absorption of the case by me and my
colleagues-a very important thing given that I generally sit for one
week out of every five or six, during which time I see thirty-one
cases and probably 2,500-3,000 pages of briefing, together with
voluminous appendices. Do not phrase the issue on appeal in so
slanted a manner as to necessarily imply the answer for which you
are pressing. Issue statements such as "Did the district court err in
ignoring the plain language and clear mandate of the statute?" serve
no meaningful purpose. If that is actually the issue in the case, then,
of course, the district court erred. However, after reading such a
statement, my natural instinct is to believe the actual issue probably
involves a matter of statutory construction, which the writer of the
brief was not nice enough to clearly state for me and has instead
left me to figure out on my own. I am, therefore, immediately less
than sanguine about the brief and, consequently, the advocate and
his or her client. Further, in failing to quickly be able to ascertain
what the issues are, I may resort to the other brief for help.
Keep in mind, especially with the statement of the issues and
the statement of the case, that while you are writing the brief to
persuade, I am first reading the brief to understand the case and the
issues presented in it. Clear, concise statements of the issues and
the case get me to this necessary level of understanding much more
quickly.
3 See FED. R. App. P. 28(g) (limiting principal briefs to 50 pages and reply briefs to
25 pages).
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The appellant's brief bears a particularly heavy burden. It must
get the judge to start thinking "reverse." The great advantage an
appellant has, however, is that in the natural order of things, the
appellant's brief is read first. Advocates should be very careful not
to destroy that advantage. If I read an appellant's brief which, clear-
ly and accurately, sets out the facts, tells me what the district court
did, explains why the district court found in appellee's favor and
then goes on to explain why that decision was in error, I get en-
gaged in a case and stay with that brief. Such a brief is a joy to read
because it allows me to understand the entire case without wasting
any time. If the brief has also made me think that the equities or the
law suggest reversal, then it has been truly successful. On the other
hand, if it leaves me wondering what happened other than that the
district court ruled in a way that upset the appellant, it has
accomplished nothing.
With regard to the factual recitation and the description of the
disposition below, I occasionally come across statements that are so
incredible that they strike me as likely being material distortions of
the record. Distortions will actually make me stop reading the brief
and go to the district court's opinion, or even the opposing brief.
Obviously, advocates should seek to prevent this from happening
and to keep my attention directed toward their brief. I realize that in
some cases it may be tempting to distort the record slightly in favor
of your client. I believe that this temptation is greatest in advocates
who either individually, or as a firm, do not appear often in our
court and thus perceive that they have less to lose if they lose some
credibility. The "repeat players" in our court, including the various
Unites States Attorney's offices and the Federal Defender Unit of the
Legal Aid Society, are, I believe, less subject to this temptation
because the institutional credibility of these offices with the court is
largely their stock in trade.
Whatever the temptation may be, remember that in addition to
your adversary, there are three of us on a panel, and we each have
talented clerks. Accordingly, the chances of slipping some distortion
by us all are fairly slim, and there is a price to be paid for getting
caught distorting the facts. Initially, this price may be said to only
affect the credibility of the advocate, which for the above reasons
some may find worth the risk; however, ultimately the total price is
paid by the client because it inhibits that advocate's ability to
persuade.
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A discreet subsection of the factual recitation, the "proceedings
below" section, is a place where distortion is completely unaccept-
able and very damaging. I first want to emphasize that my col-
leagues and I know the district court judges in this Circuit very
well, and hold these judges in very high regard. This fact, combined
with the fact that many of us, including myself, were district court
judges earlier in our careers, makes ad hominem attacks on the
district court judge or his or her handling of the case unlikely to
benefit, and likely to become a detriment to, your client. I occasion-
ally find that I simply have a difficult time believing that a district
court behaved in the outrageous manner the advocate says it has.
When such behavior is asserted by an advocate, I am likely to go
directly to the appendix to see what actually happened. If the state-
ment is accurate, fine. If not, not only has the advocate lost credibil-
ity, but now I have (at least temporarily) abandoned the brief in
favor of reading the district court's decision or other portions of the
record. There is simply no quicker way to lose credibility than to
distort or mischaracterize the actions of the district court. There is
almost no chance that an advocate will be able to slip such a distor-
tion by me because I will almost always read the district court's
decision, and I instruct my clerks to do so when preparing
a memorandum on a case for me.
The presentation of the legal argument in the case should also
be guided by the principles of clarity and accuracy. These principles
apply to the drafting of the legal argument in the following ways:
First and foremost, cite cases accurately. Misleadingly cropped quo-
tations and other misstatements of holdings will be caught, either by
your adversary or by the court. While I certainly do not know the
vast expanse of the law off of the top of my head, I do possess a
good sense of what the law is not, and I am, therefore, able to
quickly spot distortions of precedent. Even if neither I nor one of
my colleagues spots a misstatement in our review of the brief or
during argument, any misstatements will be caught when a member
of the bench sits down to write the opinion, leaving a judge who is
somewhat upset with you to write the disposition of your case.
Needless to say, having this happen is not in the best interests of
your client.
I would also like to recommend that all advocates distinguish
contrary authority, even in their opening brief. If there is bad prece-
dent out there for your case, you can assume your adversary will
cite it to us, or we will independently find it. If the first time I see
1998]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
an adverse case is in the answering brief, then my initial reaction is
that the appellant does not have a good explanation as to why that
case is inapposite. While a response in the reply brief may dispel
this initial impression, it may not. Therefore, by failing to mention
contrary precedent in the opening brief, the advocate makes that
precedent more weighty than it perhaps should be.
In sum, the guiding principles in brief writing should be clarity,
conciseness and honesty. I realize that I am not breaking new
ground here, but I will state that I do not believe that I have ever
found that an advocate has lost a case because his or her brief was
too short or because his or her sentence structure was too simple. A
simple argument stated simply is far more effective than a
convoluted argument stated loquaciously.
Ill. ORAL ARGUMENT
The Second Circuit is the last circuit to afford all litigants, in-
cluding pro se litigants (although not incarcerated pro se litigants
and petitioners for mandamus and other motions) oral argument
time.4 Because of this fact and the size of our docket, the amount
of time that can be afforded to any single case is quite small, usu-
ally no more than ten to fifteen minutes or less per side. Advocates
rarely, if ever, get the amount of time they ask for and may have
questions about how such time is allotted. The answer to that ques-
tion is relatively simple: Time is allotted by the presiding judge,
namely, the judge in the middle of the bench, who is the senior
active judge on the panel. Different judges have different philoso-
phies on allotting argument time; therefore, my own view may be
of limited practical use. Regardless, I will share below a bit of my
own philosophy concerning allotting argument time.
In assigning argument time, I generally make no judgment as to
the merits of the appeal; there are appeals which are very simple
but still result in reversals. Rather, I focus primarily on the sheer
volume and complexity of the issues in the case. Moreover, I al-
ways tend to err on the side of affording advocates too little time
because such errors are easily remedied. If I find that during argu-
ment, there are many more issues to cover than I initially realized,
or that the issues are more complicated than I thought, I will extend
" See Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14
HOFSTRA L. REv. 297, 303-07 (1986).
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the advocates' allotted time, regardless of whether or not there has
been extensive questioning. However, if I afford too much time,
such time is often wasted.
Advocates can learn two important lessons from these consider-
ations. First, although I emphasize that advocates should always be
conscious of their time and not simply continue on when they are
out of time as if they are not, and as if the panel will not notice, if
an advocate really believes that he or she has a lot to say, he or she
should simply ask for additional time to make a few more brief
points. I am very likely to grant such polite requests. Second, advo-
cates should not be afraid to rest on the brief, which as noted above
should be the best possible presentation of the argument, if that is
appropriate.
The last word of advice I will give relating to the use of argu-
ment time is simple, though often overlooked. In presenting an
argument, the advocate should always remember that the bench
knows the case before the advocate opens his or her mouth. While
it is always good for the appellant's advocate to start his or her
argument by stating, "This case concerns ... ," it is almost never
necessary to give a long factual recitation because we already know
the facts. Instead, dive right into your substance. Argument time is
precious and should not be wasted advising the bench of facts we
already know.
With regard to the substance of the argument, many of the
same considerations which apply to the drafting of the brief apply
with equal, and sometimes greater, force. In particular, the limita-
tion of issues raised comes to mind. If the decision was made to
raise three or four issues in the brief, it does not necessarily follow
that all of those issues also need to be raised in the argument. Focus
instead on the one, or perhaps two, best arguments that you have.
As limited as the brief is, argument time is even more so. If you
choose to so limit your argument, simply conclude by stating that
with regard to the issue(s) you have not discussed, you will rest on
your brief.
Moreover, if you have raised a number of issues in the brief
and decide to only argue one of them which you consider to be
most important, that does not necessarily mean that you will only
argue that one point at argument because a member of the panel
may disagree with you as to what is the most important issue to be
addressed. Various reasons exist for questioning from the bench, but
it is primarily to help us understand the case and, specifically, your
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client's position on certain issues. It is, however, also to raise issues
that we think should be brought to the attention of the other mem-
bers of the panel; we are in essence, as I once heard one of the cur-
rent justices of the Supreme Court say, speaking to each other
through the advocate. Questioning can also be designed to focus
the discussion to an issue of particular importance and difficulty in
the case. Accordingly, do not be worried if you have an active pan-
el; we are not trying to cross-examine you and trick you into giving
away the store. Instead, be happy that the panel has taken enough
of an interest in your case to participate because generating such
interest is an important first step towards success.
The following specific guidelines may be of use when respond-
ing to questioning from the bench: First, and most obviously, al-
ways be respectful. It is somewhat surprising how excited some
advocates can become during the course of the argument, but re-
member that cutting off the questions of a judge is never a good
way to win points with the panel. However, being respectful does
not mean that you should not be forceful. Simply because a mem-
ber of the panel is trying to make a specific point from the bench
does not necessarily imply that the questioner is correct. If you
disagree, simply state for instance: "I understand your point, your
Honor, however, as I read Jones v. Smith .... ." Second, just like in
brief writing, confront the negative precedent. Recently, there was
an advocate who was asked, "Doesn't Jones v. Smith bar your
client's claim?" The advocate responded, 'Your Honor, as I've
noted in my brief, not as I read it. However, to the extent you may
think it does, I think Jones v. Smith is wrongly decided and this
panel should overrule it." Honesty and clarity always win points
with the panel. Third, always answer the question that was asked.
The best practice is to always begin your answer with a "yes" or
"no," and then continue on with an explanation, a qualifier or what-
ever else you may want to add.
Finally, I would like to reemphasize one simple point regarding
the style of the argument-remember your audience. Many a trial
lawyer appears before the court and forgets that his or her audience
is no longer a jury but rather a panel of judges. These trial lawyers
often seem caged behind the podium, yearning to pace the court-
room as they would during summation before a jury and engage in
exaggerated gesturing with their hands and arms. These actions are,
from my point of view, somewhat distracting and take away from
the overall effectiveness of the argument.
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Similarly, as judges we are not especially susceptible to dis-
tracting hyperbole, either in briefs or in argument. A good example
of this occurred recently when an advocate began his argument by
stating, 'in my twenty-five years of practice, I have never," at which
point the advocate was cut off by the presiding judge, in this in-
stance not myself. The presiding judge, who sensed where the
advocate was going with this opening (that the advocate had never
seen such egregious errors committed by a district court), told the
advocate that the panel did not really care how long the advocate
had been practicing and to move onto his argument. By warning
against hyperbole, I do not mean to imply that advocates should not
alert the court to the equities of the case. The equities of the case
may be very important, and they may cause a judge to take a par-
ticular interest in a case. Such interest can only help your client as
it may cause the judge to look deeper into the law to determine if
there is a way to accommodate the equities. In fact, interesting a
member of the panel in a particular case may be the most important
thing that an advocate can achieve at oral argument.
IV. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
While the primary focus of this Article is to provide some com-
mentary on appellate advocacy and practice, in doing so, it is also
appropriate to give advocates a better view of how judges of the
Second Circuit generally decide cases. Usually, I have a clear indi-
cation of which way I am inclined to rule prior to argument based
on the briefs. However, in some cases my initial inclination will
change in argument or based on the comments of my colleagues,
and in others I may be on the fence until well after argument.'
While I believe that the process of decision making should
remain somewhat of a mystery to the advocate, the basics are as fol-
lows: Each day following argument, the panel discusses the
morning's cases and preliminarily votes on the disposition, method
of disposition and assignment. In difficult cases, such a vote may
not occur until later, and in cases where there is either a disagree-
ment as to outcome or as to reasoning, we will often circulate so-
' For an interesting view on the importance of oral argument in determining the
outcome of cases, see Myron H. Bright, The Power of the Spoken Word: In Defense of
Oral Argument, 72 IOwA L. REV. 35, 40 n.32-33 (1986) (noting that in a limited study
of three appellate judges, oral arguments changed their views in 31%, 17% and 13% of
cases heard).
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called "voting memoranda" to each other. This process is well-de-
scribed in an article written by Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg a num-
ber of years ago, although the practice has diminished to a certain
extent since the writing of that article due to the increased size of
our docket.6
The various methods of disposition are as follows: The summa-
ry order is a short, unpublished order which disposes of the case
and has no precedential value. Summary orders are issued in cases
where there is direct controlling precedent from either the Supreme
Court or the Second Circuit. Summary orders neither contain full
factual recitations (because they are intended only for the consump-
tion of the parties rather than the general public) nor a full legal
analysis of all the issues presented. Rather, they merely contain a
brief explanation as to why a particular precedent or precedents are
controlling. I should also note that just because a case is disposed
of by summary order does not mean that it receives summary treat-
ment. The briefs are fully read and digested, and the arguments are
fully considered. The brevity of the resulting order simply allows for
the relatively quick disposition of the matter.
The per curiam opinion is usually a short opinion which covers
a very specific and discrete issue on which there is no direct con-
trolling authority from either the Supreme Court or the Second
Circuit. A per curiam opinion often incorporates by reference the
reasoning of a published disposition by some other court, such as
adopting the reasoning of one of our sister circuits in a similar case
or adopting the district court's reasoning in the disposition below.
The per curiam opinion is published and constitutes binding prece-
dent. As such, it will contain, either directly or by reference, a
sufficiently complete recitation of the facts to make its precedential
value clear.
The last method of disposition is the signed opinion, and the
signed opinion is the primary manner in which the common law
evolves. The most difficult cases involving the most interesting
issues are disposed of in this manner. The process of preparing an
opinion differs widely among chambers, and I think that this pro-
cess, at least as it operates in my chambers, is best kept a mystery. I
will, however, tell you that once a proposed opinion is drafted, it is
circulated to the other members of the panel for comments and
suggestions. The other members of the panel may ultimately decide
6 See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 298-303.
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to join in the proposed opinion or in the idiom of the Second Cir-
cuit, authorize the author "to sign a tab" on their behalf,' or concur
or dissent. The level of interaction between panel members on a
proposed opinion varies widely from caseto case and from panel to
panel. No meaningful generalizations can really therefore be made
on this aspect of the decision making process. Suffice it to say that
each member of the panel is fully satisfied with the draft before it is
filed.
CONCLUSION
In concluding, I would like to note that I am honored to have
been asked to contribute this piece, and hope that in it I have per-
haps given practitioners a useful view of practice before the Second
Circuit.
7 See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 314-15 (discussing the use of the 'tab' in the
Second Circuit).
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